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VII. PHYSICIAN PRACTICE MANAGEMENT
TIM RAVICH: ... Our final panel [will discuss PPMs or Physician Practice
Management Companies]. I'll present the panelists from the my left to right.
First is MARC AUERBACH. He is a partner in the Miami office of the law
firm of Kirkpatrick & Lockhart. Mr. Auerbach attained his law degree cum
laude from Temple University. Mr. Auerbach practices primarily in the areas
of health and corporate law. His focus is on structuring and negotiating
transactions with an emphases on financing and structural issues and issues
related to the development of new business. Marc also provides general
representation to a wide range of health care entities, including physicians
groups, HMOs, hospitals, PPMs, IPAs, diagnostic facilities, and equipment
manufacturers. Such representation ranges from rendering advice on fraud
and abuse issues, developing compensation structures, and assisting in the
purchase or sale of a variety of entities of physician groups. Marc, thank you
for helping put this Symposium together.
Next is JEFFREY L. COHEN. In organizing this Symposium, Jeff was
among the first to be contacted and was, in fact, the first person to commit to
participating.
Jeff Cohen was inhouse counsel for the Florida Medical Association until
1993, when he was recruited to head up a Ft. Lauderdale health care practice.
He is currently a shareholder of Strawn, Monaghan & Cohen P.A., and is
Board Certified by the Florida Board as an expert in health care law. His
practice is devoted 100% to representing health care professionals, hospitals
and other health care facilities in transactional matters. Mr. Cohen is a
member of the American Health Lawyers Association, the Doctors Advisory
Network of the American Medical Association, the American Society for
Medical Association Council, and the Florida Hospital Association. He
served as a member of the Executive Committee of the Health Law Section of
the Florida Bar from 1994 to 1997 and has chaired the Managed Care Division
of the health law sections. Also, Mr. Cohen was a member of the Antitrust
Advisory Committee to the Agency for Health Care Administration in 1993.
Mr. Cohen is also an Adjunct Professor at Nova Southeastern University.
Additionally Mr. Cohen was named "Best Health Care Attorney" at the 1995
Medical Business Health Care Awards and has been selected by his peers as
the leading health care attorney. Mr. Cohen is a frequent lecturer and author
on health care law topics. Jeff again thanks for being here.
JAY MARTUS was, similarly, one of an initial group of significant
practitioners to commit to this Symposium. Jay is a sincere supporter of the
University of Miami and to any cause that will promote it. Jay is a graduate
of the University of Miami School of Law, receiving his degree summa cum
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laude. He was a member of the University of Miami Law Review, president
of the Moot Court Board, and a member of the Iron Arrow Honor Society.
We are delighted to have him. Mr. Martus represents Sheridan Health Corp.,
serving as inhouse counsel since 1994. Jay, thanks for your help.
With that, I will turn [the forum] over to the panelists.
JEFF COHEN: Thanks very much Tim. I am going to introduce just very
briefly the overview where I think we are going to go and what I hope you will
walk away with.
But, just to give you, those of you who aren't familiar with some of the
panel members. You've really got a great representation of the industry. Jay
[Martus] is probably the only person who has really been, that I know of
involved with the single start to finish transmigration to PPMC business. And
Marc [Auerbach], of course, has been involved primarily [on] the other side
representing people doing business with that industry since its inception. So,
it's a tremendous wealth of knowledge and experience and I'm very interested
in particular to some of the things they have to say about, in particular, where
the industry is going.
What I would like to do is just give you an idea of some of the things that
I'm doing and seeing in the industry. And then turn it over to Marc
[Auerbach] and obviously to Jay [Martus]. And what I hope you walk away
with and get a sense of where the PPM industry is today and where it's going
- some of the transmutations. Because it is, as you know, an industry in
great turmoil and chaos and opportunity, depending on your perspective [... ].
For fun I looked up on the internet, in particular, the muscular-skeletal portion
of the PPMC industry which is very hard hit. Just to give you an idea: the
fifty-two week range for BMJ Medical Management is now trading at 1/16th;
the highest was 8-8/75. It is now in Chapter 11 in Delaware... it has been
subject of multiple shareholder derivative actions and underwriter derivative
actions [.. .1 Integrated Orthopedics, fifty-two week range: 1-1/68 to 7.12; it
is now at 1-13/16. .. - Obviously an industry that has been tremendously hit.
In my opinion, and I am going to speak in broader terms, and try and stay
away from some of the technical issues because I think they have been
handled thoroughly well before we got here - but I think in some respect the
industry has been hard hit in a deserving fashion in some respects and in a
nondeserving fashion.
There are those, myself among them, who feel that some of the PPMC
businesses are grossly undervalued for what they do; and there are some parts
of that industry, I feel but for the arbitrage portion of their business, never
would have been in business, never will be in business and there is no place
for them in the market. The services that physicians that we are looking for
in affiliating with PPMCs were in my experience, in many respects, ghost
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services. And there seem to be two ways to ramp up to get those services for
PPMCs. Either you do that pre-IPO or you do it post-IPO and either way you
have to have a very strong management-services core. And I think one of the
huge failings of the industry is that it failed to deliver those services. It failed
to be able to have the wherewithal, and to ever provide those services.
Backing up just a bit, I think it's important to distinguish between PPMCs,
which I consider to be pure PPMCs, and PPMC's which I think are more akin
to group practices. Those practices, like Pediatrics and Sheridan, are really
in my opinion fit more in the group practice mode in the sense they have a
great deal of control and a great deal of integration among the practices. It's
more of an employment model business. Those practices I think are doing
very well and I think there will be a place for them in the future. And I think
they are being unfairly hit by the market. The other PPMCs like BMJ and
[...] and MedPartners and Phymatrix, - those other businesses which have
found that arbitrage move has forced them out of the market. Those
businesses in that model, I would be shocked to see resurrected in any form.
One of the things I used to do a lot of is do these PPMC deals on behalf
of physicians and physician groups. I've never represented a PPMC. And
now a lot of what I'm doing is unwinding those deals. I'd say half of my time
is spent unwinding the PPMC deals. And I thought it would be kind of fun to
give you an idea of two of those unwinds. What it looked like going in and
what it looked like coming out, just on the business side.
Group one, physicians received $1.3 million. Their assets were pur-
chased, their ARs [accounts receivables] were purchased, their obligations
were assumed. Within a year and a half, they were offered the opportunity to
take back their ARs, their receivables, take back their assets and to receive
another $1.3 million to unwind that transaction. So they got to sell it twice,
in essence. And of course, they walked away very happy with that transaction.
Another transaction was $2.3 million was the sell price, cash at closing, no
stock. Great foresight for them because the stock is now worth paper. Their
deal, last I checked was $700,000 cash. They get ARs back, which are about
750 gross, - collectable is somewhere around 350, 400. They get their assets
back, they have to reassume, obviously, all their old business obligations, the
leases - and what have you, $700,000. That deal is one year old. They got
capital gains treatment on the purchase price for the 2.3, all of it. So, what
seems to be happening is that those who are waiting - the deals are getting
better in the unwinds. I think some of the problems that the PPMCs are
experiencing are self wrought in the sense that they've announced that they do
not want to be in the business, I think that by doing that, that was kind of
blood in the water. And the physicians and their counsel have really looked
to take advantage of the circumstances. And I think it's working very well for
the doctors. At the end of the day, the irony, I think, for the doctors has been
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that, yeah this has not been the greatest experience for them, - these tradi-
tional peer PPMCs. But, on the other hand, I haven't seen one, in my exper-
ience, who [hasn't] come out economically far ahead of where they began.
From there I'm going to pass it off to Marc...
MARC AUERBACH: ... Thanks. A lot of my practice focuses on the
physician's side. But I think it's helpful to give a little background - the way
physicians think, and the way they come to these type of deals, and why they
are.... you know, these practice management groups in the first place. I think
if you ask most physicians, especially the ones who have been around for a
while - they would have liked it [the way it] was in the old days when there
was private pay and Medicare, Medicaid and they went in, they did their work
and they got paid. Unfortunately, from that perspective, HMOs came around
and hospital chains became for-profit, and were developing their own
networks - so that they felt they needed a mechanism to respond to that. At
the same time that managed care industries [were] growing. You got a lot
more regulation both at the federal level and the state level. ... Both federal
and state legislation kind of left a loophole, at least the way the physicians
looked at it, which was the group practice loophole. A lot of physicians [are]
going away from what they had traditionally liked to do which was to have
one, two, maybe three physicians. As they got more senior they would bring
in a younger guy and they were forced to get into the group practice modality
because that way they had to treat patients to survive. Then, when they were
finally used to that idea, Wall Street gets involved. And all of a sudden, you
have a lot of people who were never involved in the health care industry at all;
and they're out there and they're developing these economic models and their
colleagues are all caught up and [saying,] "Can't believe what these people are
paying. I've got to get in. Find me a deal. Find me a deal!"
On the way over I tried to jot down some of the things, I think, it's
important I think, from the lawyers stand point. The lawyers think that the
laws are all fair and these physicians are reading the laws and reacting to the
laws. That's really not what's happening. What's happening is there's a
business environment out there. And they are reacting to the business
environment and hopefully.., and then before they do something, but a lot
of times after they do something they will call up their lawyers and say, 'This
is what I want to do and this is what I've done. Is it O.K.?" So, I think it
complicates the matter for lawyers. I think the practice management
companies have had some successes and have had some glaring failures in
trying to address, at least what the physicians perceived as what they wanted
to get out of the practice management companies.
I just want to run through a few of them because I think it's important to
get the mindset of the physicians. And when Jay [Martus] speaks you'll get
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the mindset of the practice management companies and kind of run through
what the physicians are looking for [and] what they actually got and then to
try to leave at the end, real quickly where I think the physicians are going, -
and probably where I think the practice management companies are going very
generally.
What the physicians look for first-and-foremost, I think, is they wanted
compensation for what they perceived as what they have built up in value in
their practice. They have been out in practice, five, ten, fifteen, twenty years
and they felt they had built up a certain value in their practice and they wanted
to get this value out when they sold. And I think the practice management
companies did, probably, too good a job in that area and that they overpaid in
that portion of it, and put a lot of cash in physician's hands. So, with respect
to that, what the physicians were looking for and what the practice
management companies were providing ended up pretty good. I think the
physicians got a better deal than they probably deserved. The other thing the
physician was looking for was growth. And not growth necessarily in terms
of getting more contracts, but what I would consider using a retail concept,
"same store growth." They wanted to enhance their specific practice and have
that practice grow.
I think there's a mixed bag with respect to how the practice management
companies have done in that area. I think, the primary problem they have had
is, I think most of the practice management companies didn't understand what
incentivised physicians and didn't build in enough incentives in the
contractual relationships that they had. The practice management companies
that have done well in that area are the group practice models, where they
have you treated; the physicians [work] more as part of team and integrate
them as employees. There has also been good growth in the practice
management companies that have focused on practices where there's a lot of
ancillary services involved, so that the practice management companies came
in with capital and we are able to go out perhaps to get some equipment that
perhaps the physicians were not able to secure individually and they are able
to grow through that area.
The other main area I think the physicians were looking for was
professional management. I think, that's an area, I think by-and-large the
practice management companies have not done a good job to date. I think
they are getting better but I think initially what happens is a lot of these
practice management companies had a Wall Street mentality and these are
business people and not necessarily people who had experience in the health
care field. Although I think that's changing and it's getting better. It wasn't
there in the beginning. This is a problem ... not unique to the practice
management companies. The other entities who are out there acquiring
physician practices are hospital chains. I think a lot of the hospital chains
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went out and said, "We can run our hospitals, we really know what we are
doing and we're going to go out and buy these practices." And what's
becoming readily apparent is most hospitals may be very good on the Part A
side but they really don't know how to run the Part B side which is the
physician practices; and as a general rule they have been really poor at it, in
my personal opinion. I think the physicians look for some kinds of economies
of scale as being involved with the larger entities.
I think the practice management companies have done a pretty good job
in certain specific areas. They've helped reduce malpractice rates, with
respect to some kind of supplies - in some - purchasing, they've done a
pretty good job in that area.
I think [an]other thing that physicians looked in, I kind of lump it together,
which was access to capital, access to technology. There has been a pretty
good success rate in that area except a lot of it was the brass ring that they
were not able to grab. I represented a physician group that people came to
them and said, "Well, come with us. We have all this technology and we are
going to put in computerized billing. This is a wonderful thing. We are going
to put in computerized medical records." And the doctors loved this idea, -
"Computerized medical records, it's the wave of the future. Let's do it. Let's
do it." And they called me and I said, "That's very nice, but in Florida the
Board of Medicine still requires you to have paper records as well, so, the
computer medical records are really, - it's time hasn't come yet because
Florida hasn't moved into the next century yet!" So I think while technology
access has been good, it hasn't been as good as the physicians anticipated.
The last two things were [physicians] viewed [physician management
companies] as an investment vehicle. A lot of physicians said, "We'll give the
stock, fantastic. We're going to retire. We give them these cheap stocks and
we're going to retire." Unfortunately, in almost every instance the cheap
stock got much cheaper. And then the final thing was contract leverage. The
ability to go out and get these big managed care contracts. And I think that in
that area it was really a hodge-podge. Some of the practice management
companies have been very good in securing contracts. Some of them have
been marginally successful at best. The physicians generally have a mixed
view point, but I don't think the experience has been what they expected of it.
Just very briefly, - some of things that physicians groups that I've
represented and other physician groups that I know that are going to try and
operate in this environment outside the scope of the physician management
companies. I think you've seen kind of the hybrid of it which is the physicians
who said, "We don't need, you know, the Wall Street types. We'll go out and
form our own physician management companies." So you're seeing the
second generation practice management companies which have been the
physician-owned ones. And they're sales pitch is, "We're run by doctors, we
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understand doctors and we'll do a better job." The jury is still out on that.
I'm not convinced that that model really works.
A lot of physician groups have gone to what I call "Vertical Integration."
And vertical integration in certain specialties has worked very well in my
opinion. For example, [consider] if you have group of noninvasive
cardiologists and they are trying to see how they want to react to the market
place. What they may decide to do is go out and bring in an invasive
cardiologist, they'll bring in a cardiac surgeon. So they are kind of going
upstream vertically and then they go downstream vertically and they'll bring
in a bunch of internal medicine guys to kind of feed the pipeline. And that
model [has] worked pretty well if you happen to be fortunate enough to
practice in a specialty that allows for vertical integration. I think, if you read
the paper you see an interesting response, I think an interesting physician
response is probably now more than any time when I've been practicing; you
see, really, some inroads in the labor movement. And for the first time you're
really seeing the unions are penetrating the physician marketplace. When I
started practicing that was unheard of. No physician would join the union or
very, very few [would]. I think that's changed and you are now seeing the
classic response to the business community to large contracting parties on one
side. What they are doing is unionizing, and where that goes I don't know.
I think that's another interesting area I think you should keep your eyes on
because I think physician unions are probably going to become more prevalent
in Florida. It's one of the areas that they are targeting.
Physicians have also expanded into related fields.... [W]hat I mean by
that is I have physicians that have gone out and got their third party
administrator license, "TPA licenses." They've formed their own
management companies. They've gotten into software products, where they
have developed software protocols and software credentialing. And now they
are becoming software marketers. Another area that they've gotten involved
with is clinical studies. And now the practice management companies are
kind of following suit. The whole clinical study industry is taking off a little
bit. And finally, you're kind of seeing the flip side of it is, I think I may be
wrong, I think it's the [... ] clinic, the orthopedic clinic, where now the
physician practices are saying, "We don't want the hospitals buying us, we
want the practice; we're going to go out and buy everything." And they're
negotiating to actually go out and buy hospitals and taking vertical integration
one step even further on the evolutionary chain and now they are going to own
the hospital as well: We'll see if the people who know Part B can manage
Part A any better than the other way around.
The other things I'm seeing a little of is kind of little niches. There's
more attention to the pharmacy field. A lot of the physicians groups,
especially the primary care groups are trying to form what I call "EPOs,"
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where they are trying to have one large employer where they will go to the
employer and say, "We are primary care physicians, we'll service all your
employees on some kind of set fee bases, either a capitator or discounted fee,"
- there is a broad spectrum of that - and that's starting now with very large
employers - to take hold [...] mainly with pharmacy products and primary
care, [... 1.
Finally I think that physicians in certain areas are getting into the lobbying
mode, I think one of the panelists in the presentation before us talked about
lobbying to get rid of Bakarania.' They really, in my opinion, have not done
much lobbying in that area, but they certainly have been doing lobbying in the
area of open access, mandated coverage. This is what I would call "super
coverage" for managed care entities where, for instance, in the area of
diabetes, [... ] the HMO law basically mandated that the managed care
companies had to cover all aspects of diabetes. There is lobbying going on.
I don't know of any specific lobbying dealing with Bakarania-type issues, but
the physicians have evolved a little bit and they do understand lobbying that
may play a role. My personal opinion is some of the dinosaurs on the
physician side [... ], and they're going to evolve into PACs, in my opinion.
And they are going to become some what of a lobbying entity.
Real brief, I don't want to steal Jay [Martus'] thunder: I think practice
management companies are going to be here, they are going to survive, they
are going to evolve a little bit. I went through a short list but I'll let Jay
[Martus] expand - but what my physicians are looking for, and I think what
the practice management companies are looking for - I think you are going
to see lower upfront purchases; the dollar amount is going to go down. There
is going to be real due diligence. I tell my physicians, "You really got to clean
up your act; the practice management companies are really going to do due
diligence. They are not going to play arbitrage game, where they buy in at a
multiple of 6, they don't care if it's profitable because they are selling at a
multiple of 20, they're going to want to see you can make a profit." I think
you are going to see an incentive-based compensation. And if you take that
even further, I think you are going to see true employees, which is the model
I think probably works. You are going to see shorter range management con-
tracts - management contracts without the failure to perform. I think there
is going to be a focus on real benefits. I think in terms of ancillary, in terms
of technology, - I read an article recently that most physician practice com-
puters aren't Y2K compliant. I think the sophisticated management company
is going to come in and say, "Well, you know, We are Y2K compliant, we'll
I See Section Vl, The Role of the Florida Board of Medicine and the Bakarania Decision, supra
p. 450.
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make sure all your billing is done." In the short run, I think you are going to
see more of that. I think there is still going to be some consolidation in the
industry, but right now I think the practice management companies are
probably undervalued and I think the successful ones - and Jay [Martus] will
probably tell you about this more - the successful ones recognize that and
ate trying to take traditional tactical measures to secure that value. I think you
probably saw in the paper that Pediatrics has adopted a poison pill to make it
less attractive to potential suitors. So, I think a lot of these industries go
through cycles. It's in a down cycle now. I don't think the industry is gone,
I think it's here to stay. I think it will evolve somewhat to be more
sophisticated, more streamlined. But I think it's here to stay and I think the
physicians recognize that and the physicians are gearing up to deal with it.
Jay [Martus] you're the other side of the story...
JAY MARTUS: ... I'm general counsel of [Sheridan Healthcorp].... I want
to step back a little bit, I think it's important to understand I view myself not
as the general counsel of a physician practice management company, I view
myself as being an attorney who, for fifteen years, has represented providers.
And I view this as, really, we have to step back out of the mind set of this
being the physician practice management field and look at this in its
traditional lens. There it is a triad of health care that we've looked at
traditionally over the years, which has been between hospitals, the providers,
and the payors. Today they're called managed care companies, but a little
before I started practicing they were indemnity companies. Then, we started
seeing HMOs. And now we're seeing a new hybrid coming out of the
managed care companies. Hospitals, short-term less acute care facilities are
now evolving. We have seen a variety of combat over who controls the health
care dollar profits. Is it the payor? Is it the provider? Is it the hospital or the
long-term facility that are getting those dollars? That has lead to an evolution
in the last ten years, which has seen things like IPAs, PHOs MSOs. And
MSOs were the precursor. MSOs, Management Service Organizations, were
the precursor to the physician practice management companies. In Florida
there was no need for a physician practice management company because we
do not have the corporate practice of management doctrine.
My company is in seven states, with 56 facilities, with 350 physicians.
We have about $125 million in annual revenues. Quite frankly, until 1994, we
were only in Florida. We were really basically a group practice. We did a
leveraged buyout and a year later we went public to take advantage of a
capital market to acquire additional practices and go into different markets.
What has happened? Companies like ours which are really bona fide group
practice models had taken advantage of a structure which was a long-term
management services organization relationship and used that structure, even
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in states where it wasn't necessary like Florida. Why did we do that? We did
that for one reason: because the Securities and Exchange Commission
permitted us to amortize the value over the fair market value of the assets,
which is known as good will, over a forty year period. By doing that on an
accounting bases we could stretch the value and the profitability in the
earnings of that practice that we acquired and show a greater profitability to
Wall Street and get a higher multiple; it was the darling of Wall Street. That,
combined with the movement towards capitated contracts or contracts where
you are not paid a fee-for-service but a dollar amount per member per month
to take care of all the health care services of a population, appeared to be to
Wall Street and to everybody else, as these pie-in-the-sky, rainbows with a pot
of gold at the end of the tunnel. Well what happened? The Securities and
Exchange Commission created a group called the "E1TF," the Emerging Issues
Task Force. They decided, "Gosh, you know, these mandated service
arrangements, even though they are forty years in duration, - think maybe
they don't have a useful life at that time" - and they reduced it back to
twenty years. Well companies like ours went back and we adjusted our
accounting, and we went back and began to look at these management services
relationships and say, "In states where we could employee the physician, -
what's the benefit of having this extra piece of verbiage, this extra piece of
relationship where we don't actually have greater control and integration of
those positions?" So we began to put in devices which would allow us to get
rid of them at will.
We, instead of just simply having a management services arrangement, -
we also had a parallel to that which was an option agreement to buy all the
shares of the stock of the corporation for $100, so that we could essentially
acquire the practice, use the MSO, take advantage of this earnings write-off
advantage until such time as there was a problem. Well, boom, thank you very
much, the Board of Medicine comes up with Bakarania. Bakarania looks at
these percentage of revenues relationships and they say, "Gosh, you know
that's really fee splitting." By the way I totally disagree that it's fee splitting.
I think that Marshall [Burack] said it properly, that it's basically an ultra vires
act of the Board of Medicine. But who cares? Because in Florida, I can
employ you. I exercise my option, I employ you, I integrate my model. It
doesn't make any sense. I don't recall who the panelist was in the prior panel
but they talked about this and they said - I think it was [Alberto Hernandez]
- "I think it's stupid because its form over substance. I can do everything I
want as an employer, as a physician practice management company that I can't
do in a PPMC, MSO model, by doing it in a direct employee-employer model
- anything I want, and not have a problem whatsoever with the Board of
Medicine." So to me, as far as its impact on the industry and PPMCs, if you
can approach this as a true group practice model and you could take out the
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problem of having an unnecessary MSO relationship, Bakarania doesn't
matter. It's something that everyone structured. Now if you had the foresight
to have these clauses and have alternative structures such as options and have
the opportunity to go forward you don't need to worry about unwinding. And
because this market was overheated, because the public sector presented these
tremendous multiples, - Wall Street handing out dollars left and right, -
there were a number of PPMs that went out there, didn't have the foresight,
the thinking to structure deals, knowing that the regulatory scheme changes
day to day, and [the thinking] that you have the key to being successful in the
health care industry whether you are a hospital, whether you are a payor,
whether you are a physician group, a provider group, a PPMC, whatever you
want to call it, - is to maintain structures which enable you to be flexible in
an ever-changing regulatory environment. And the successful PPMs will
become whatever the next name isn't tainted on Wall Street. And in two or
three years, companies like ourselves will come back out again. And will
come back out again stronger, with more earnings, with more foresight, and
will go back to the core values that creates value. Exactly what you were
saying, Marc [Auerbach].
The core values that we look for when putting deals together are bringing
together synergies of providers. We have started out traditionally as an
anesthesia company, and as an anesthesia company we're hospital based. In
1990, when I really began to become the counsel, 1989, 1990, when I became
the counsel for this group - we were vulnerable. We were vulnerable to the
managed care companies coming in telling the hospital administrators, "You
know that anesthesia group has too high a fee and if they had lower fees we'd
bring more patients into you hospital." It wasn't true, but that was the
argument that was often used. And we were vulnerable. We were vulnerable
for them bringing in someone else to replace us in that circumstance. Well if
we could bring in, and buy things that were complementary to that anesthesia
contract such as ObGYN, and surgery practices and protect that interest
because we now not only have the hospital-based services but have services
which are complementary and bring revenue to that hospital. Now we have
leverage with one aspect to the triad, the hospital. We have leverage with the
other aspect of the triad, the managed care companies. And guess what? We
can create true value for everyone in the game, which doesn't take money out
of the mouths of the doctors.
How do we do that? Let's take Dr. X. Dr. X is in [an... ] area between
two facilities. Dr. X is an ObGYN. He takes his business and instead of
providing it and splitting it between two hospitals, he brings it over here to the
hospital where we have anesthesia, neonatology, pediatric intensive care, and
he now replicates his earnings, he gets his money, and we get an increased
boost as a result of that integration into a true group practice model. And the
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hospital sees additional value. Everyone wins. And the managed care
company has less leverage with both the hospital and the providers. Those are
the types of values that can come about.
Talking about incentives, the way we structure our transactions, the way
most successful PPMs structure their transactions is to pay a multiple of
earnings which correlates to reasonable term of the employment relationship
with the physician. So let's say you are going to have a five year relationship
with that physician, and you're going to pay them a four multiple or five
multiple of their earnings. Let me explain to you what that means because it's
important for you to understand our business. Dr. X makes a million dollars
a year today, that's a million dollars of earnings, - his revenue. Fifty percent
of that million dollars go to pay his practices expenses so he really only makes
$500,000. He puts the $500,000 in his pocket. If Dr. X was recruited out of
medical school and he were 3 or 4 years out and he wasn't an owner of that
practice he would be paid $250,000 a year for that practice. If Dr. X sells me
the $500,000 less the $250,000 of earning and I pay him five times, he gets a
million dollars in his pocket, that's the compensation for equity [Marc
Auerbach discussed previously]. The other $250,000 is his salary going
forward. If he replicates his earnings going forward on the five years and he
only works for five years, unless I can replace him successfully, I'll loose
money. Oh, it's because of tax, and amortization of good will and those
things. Because I really need to keep him incentivized and keep myself incen-
tivized to keep in the practice. So if I give him an incentive compensation, -
once he reaches $250,000 or $500,000 of earnings going forward and pay him
a percentage of the excess that he generates above that, let's say 40% or 50%
of those dollars and I keep the balance of that, it's perfectly legal in Florida,
because, quite frankly, it's an employee-employer model. He has all the
benefit and all the incentive going forward of doing these transactions. This
is the type of model which most of the PPMs aren't using.
The PPM industry is riddled with the experiences of the last three years.
Coastal Health Care was the first major corpse to come along. It still exists.
I shouldn't call it a corpse; it still exists, but it went from $55 a share to a
dollar or two dollars a share. And the reason it went there is because it
decided to go into the capitation business. It went in [and] decided to take on
Humana; it was again a provider taking on a managed care, -basically
everybody talks about it as the PPM industry, it's really providers, hospitals,
and payors. They took them on, they weren't able to adequately assess, - as
no one is, - the incurred but not reported claims and the company crashed
and burned because it did not meet the expectations of the Wall Street
analysts. The second one to crash and burn was really FPA. FPA, except for
a physician practice group of emergency physicians known as Sterling, was
really nothing more than a shell, again trying to pull together without any
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value, a group of networking arrangements with physicians ... adding no true
real value, having no true integration, having no true management. The
MedPartners and Phycore-MedPartners was nothing more than an offshoot of
HealthSouth, which was a very successful hospital piece of the triad, [which]
decided to offshoot into the physician area to try to put everything and
anything they can and use the model Marc [Auerbach] was describing, - buy
at six, have a multiple of twenty. Two years ago touted as being the next great
monolith of health care, they bought the Mulligan Group, which is the only
true multi-group practice in California. And that was the peak, they were a
billion and a half dollar entity. The problem was there was no synergy, there
was no integrative plan, the practices didn't know what they were doing, they
weren't working on a coordinated basis for managed care contracting.
All I'm trying to tell you today is that the physician's portion of the triad
is extraordinarily fragmented today, yet it is the portion of the triad that
produces the value in health care services. It is the portion of the triad that
will be the one that dictates what goes on going forward. Hospitals are
overbuilt and underutilized. They're closing in droves. They will never be
what they were once in the past. The federal government has seen to that with
DRGs, reimbursements, and they will never ever be there again. Managed
care companies, surprise surprise, are beginning to feel the sting. [...] Why?
People are angry. They're angry that the plans systematically do not provide
value for the dollars that are paid. Why is that? The typical or average
percentage of the amount of premiums paid by managed care companies that
goes to the managed care companies is 25%. What does it cost them to
produce that 25% of the premium? Less than four percent on average. How
are they able to do that? They are able to do that because unintended
insulation from malpractice liability through ERISA, which is eroding as fast
as you can say the word "ERISA." They have the ability because the market
of physicians is so fragmented that they are able to dominate and
undercompensate those physicians for services that they provided. Everybody
has seen the physicians attempt, and PPMs are just merely one manifestation
of that to counteract the power and the leverage of managed care or payor
organizations. PHOs were the first attempt, - then IPAs, foundations, group
purchasing, group contracting. The only true way to combat at this stage is
through bona fide group practice models which take over and provide true
value and market value for services where they cannot be exploited by taking
one portion of the triad and using it against the other portion of the triad. In
other words, physicians have to be compensated for true and fair value. It's
going to happen through regulatory reform upon the state legislative basis.
There are currently 37 states in the United States of America today, as we
speak, that have current proposals to reform managed care legislation both in
terms of payor reimbursement practices, both in terms of open access, both in
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terms of the ability for physicians and members to have true assessment of the
fair value of the cost and reimbursement for services and that's only going to
escalate. And on a federal level, I think there are currently six different bills
pending before Congress, - virtually identical to the same types of subject
matter in the 37 states. What does it spell out for our industry going forward?
I really can't tell you what the shape or dimension of the PPMC industry will
be. Quite frankly, I don't view it as a PPMC vision, that's a Wall Street label
that was created in the last five years or six years. And quite frankly, I view
it as being a transitory phase for the integration and defragmentation of the
provider sector.
JEFF COHEN: I think just to follow up on a few things that Jay [Martus] said
- the interesting thing about all of these business models, whether it's a
PPMC, IPA, PHO, group practice what ever it is, we're always talking about
how to improve the physician's position in a market of shrinking
reimbursement. And that's really what the PPMs are. They are a, I think for
physician's anyway, they are a way that physicians view their position in the
market as being improved through enhanced services, enhanced purchasing
and access to capital and what have you. That's going to continue. Those that
did not get what they came for are going to continue. And I think it's very
interesting, I think all of us agree that, and probably all of us in this room that
practice in the health care field agree that the king of the models is a group
practice model of some sort, and full integration is better than partial and it
just works better and delivers better bottom line services.
JAY MARTUS: And by the way - let me just interject, I think it doesn't
matter whether you are in a corporate practice medicine state or not. We are
in corporate practice of medicine states and we have group practice models.
And the manner in which we provide those services are to, in fact, strip out the
issues that arise in Bakarania. One thing that wasn't mentioned in the
Bakarania discussion is that OIG and it's Advisory Opinion 98-42, virtually
paralleled some of the language of Bakarania. With respect to percentage of
revenues and whether that's a fee splitting arrangement, which may be
violative of fraud and abuse. I mean, from a federal level, that's a much more
troublesome pronouncement than Bakarania. But the bottom line is the same
value can be had, the same defragmentation of the industry can happen,
whether it's in a corporate practice state or not. [ ... ] the nonmedical,
nonclinical side needs to be rationalized in fair market value. Look, in order
to be a iruly successful physician practice management company you have to
2 Issued April 15, 1998.
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take the true value of the measure of the services and value of those services
out and leave the remainder to the physicians or it will not be successful going
forward. And so the answer is: It's very simple. There is no huge pot of gold
at the end of the rainbow other than hard work and growth. And that's the
answer to successful physician practice management companies.
MARC AUERBACH: I would add one piece to that. I think from representing
the physicians and seeing what the physicians are really looking for and I
think certain of the practice management companies have come a long, long
way. The physicians want to feel they are involved in the decision-making
process. You know, historically I think, a lot of people looked [at] physicians
[and said,] "They are there just to provide the care to the individuals. They
don't know anything about the business, - wear the suits, we'll take care of
it." [... ], I think the practice management companies and the other entities
at least recognize that the modem physician is a lot more sophisticated about
the business environment and most of the modem physicians are willing to be
business partners with the practice management companies. They're not
opposed to the practice management company making money as long as they
are making money in partnership with them. And I think the practice
management companies that come around to that view point are the ones that
are really successful.
JEFF COHEN: I think that's what you were saying Jay [Martus], - that one
of the problems in looking at PPMCs from the physician's aspect, most
doctors who deal with most PPMCs feel unaligned. They don't feel that they
are getting their due from the PPMC. That's the huge difference between a
company like Pediatrics or maybe Sheridan and some of the other companies
that are not in business today.
JAY MARTUS: I think from our perspective, the real issue in terms of
running the practices - we leave it to the physicians in the practices. I mean,
let them basically make all the decisions except obviously, we put in those
modem things that we need to deal with such as ADA, compliance issues with
sexual harassment issues, with respect to risk management, OSHA, the
regulatory overlays which are very welcomed and we include them in those
processes and those thinkings. We have internalized peer review processings.
I think you'll see the more progressive PPMCs, they're nothing more than an
extension of what it was for our company in 1994 when it was completely
physician-owned and physician run.
JEFF COHEN: I think that's a huge difference, because your company started
out actually providing services to physicians. Most of these companies started
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out as an arbitrage, or financial play and tried to bring the operation in around
them.
JAY MARTUS: But I think this discussion is not about Sheridan Healthcare.
This discussion is about the industry. And unless physicians continue to push
and become a part of integration processes, they are going to continue to be
squeezed harder and harder by the payor dollars and the governmental dollars.
And there's nothing more compelling to the [concept of] change than the
pocketbook and this is what is happening. The concept of, - the description
that was made of the Board of Medicine as being the older, more successful
physician, - those days of fee-for-service, seven-figure incomes are over.
The number of physicians who have seven-figure incomes has dwindled
dramatically. And the number of physicians whose incomes are above a half-
a-million dollars a year has dwindled dramatically. And the only way
physicians will continue to receive fair value for their services is to come
together in some form or another in an integrated fashion. And PPMCs [are]
merely a transitory phase in that evolutionary process.
JEFF COHEN: And I think one of the questions that's going to hang out there
from this industry's crash is: Can anybody other than physicians do this? I
think, in theory, that's true but in practice most physicians don't trust it and
are going to trust it even less.
JAY MARTUS: The key is physicians have to be intimately involved in that
process. Because only physicians can really decide what's appropriate and
necessary for the provision of medical services with a standard of care and
know what they need in order to appropriately take care of their patients -
and will feel alienated and not a part of that if they are not aligned with that
process in a rational business organization.
MARC AUERBACH: I agree with you Jay [Martus]. I believe one can't
survive without the other to be honest with you. I think the practice
management companies offer some of the services you were talking about are
notoriously bad and vice versa.
JEFF COHEN: It's interesting. One of the terms de jure that I just picked up
on the internet when I was flipping around the other day is the "FIP," a flip on
PPMCs, the FIP. I never heard of it before. It's called a "Fully Integrated
Practice." It's a group practice. So we are kind of back to where we started
from.
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(From the Audience): This is to any of the panelists. I want to put together
some type of integrated group with anesthesiologist ObGYN's and [.. .], I
didn't hear mentioned, is there a problem where if within a certain geographic
area, we have 30%, 40%, 50% of physicians, and we start triggering attention
that's going to get us?
JAY MARTUS: It's a good question in terms of antitrust. Yes and no.
Obviously you would be on inquiry [notice] and you'd have to look at it. But
you'd have to use some predatory practice. Because if you are a single
integrated entity, you wouldn't have a combination in restraint of trade. So
you would not have to worry about the first part of the Sherman Act. What
you would have to worry about is the "rule of reason" analysis as to whether
you were using that power or that leverage or that market power to unfairly
raise the price, or value, or cost of those services over and above the fair
market value. And we're not doing that and other people aren't doing that.
If you look at the range of services which are being paid in other markets for
similar services, we're lower than they are, and we're merely trying to get
those dollars so that there's a lower amount of dollars kept on the profit side
from the managed care companies. Instead of being at 25% margin maybe we
can get it to a 7% or 8% margin.
MARC AuERBACH: Two points. One, I'm not necessarily convinced that
there [are] antitrust cases out there even [saying that] even though you've
reduced prices you may be colluding in the market place. - But, there are
specific guidelines. The FTC and the Attorney General have come out with
a whole - it was nine different fact patterns, now its up [to] 20 or 21, where
they run a whole set of scenarios and there're safe harbors depending on the
type of group you have, whether it's exclusive group or nonexclusive entry to
the group. The first place I would start if I was putting together that type of
group idea and I had antitrust concerns, I go read through those regulations
and their safe harbors. They are pretty good, in terms of at least giving you,
you know, general analysis. Each case obviously, you know, you have to
analyze on it's own merits, - that's usually with respect to antitrust position.
That's usually the starting point.
JAY MARTUS: The other issue is you have to really carefully look at and is
very important [to understand] is the relevant market area. What are the
alternatives that the payors have and the consumers have to obtain services?
Because you may say that's within a 15 mile geographic area but what if five




MARC AUERBACH: The trickier issue is if you're in a nonintegrated model,
if you're not in that group practice model is the price-fixing issues. It's a much
trickier issue when you have the IPAs and some of the non-integrated model
when you have, ostensibly, competitors sitting in the room trying to determine,
"Well how should we price our services for this managed care?" That's a lot
trickier and there's all kinds of messenger models and fancy things that people
put in to place to deal with price fixing issues, which I think is more
complicated.
JAY MARTUS: That has led to the demise of IPAs, essentially.
JEFF COHEN: And as practical matter, I think most of us who deal on this
kind of business find that putting together two or three physicians, let alone
20% or 30% of any relevant product market, relevant geographic market, it's
a tough product to build.
MARC AUERBACH: Where you'll run into it is if you are in a highly specia-
lized practice area. I was involved with a group of IBF physicians and you
may be in a community where there are only two IBF physicians in the
relevant geographical market place. When you start to get involved in super
sub-specialties it may be some of the pediatrics super sub-specialties that may
come up.
JEFF COHEN: Another thing I noticed is the compensation on the physi-
cian's side gets squeezed, physicians are fighting over parts of the body that
they weren't fighting over before so all of a sudden the other alternative
services that are available is increasing, that pool is increasing. So it becomes
in some respects, and some areas actually less, a little more difficult to have
the problems that we are talking about.
TIM RAVICH: Any more questions? A sincere thank you to our excellent
panelists.
(Applause)
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
EDITED TRANSCRIPT ENDED
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